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I. INTRODUCTION
A thirty-eight-year-old orthopedic surgeon comes home to his empty house following a typical ten-hour day at the hospital. Recently
divorced and without children, he drops his keys at the front door
and heads towards the living room with the take-out dinner he
picked up on his way home. He turns on the news and pours himself
a glass of red wine. Ever since his divorce, he has been drinking wine
more frequently than he used to, perhaps to mask his loneliness. After his third or fourth glass of wine, he turns off the television,
brushes his teeth, and goes to bed.
At five o’clock in the morning, he awakes to his alarm clock and
throws on his running shoes. After his usual five-mile run, he grabs a
piece of toast and heads to the hospital. Today is just like any other
day for the surgeon; at eleven o’clock, he reviews the chart of a patient scheduled for a total knee-replacement. The surgeon goes into
the operating room to discuss with the patient, one more time, the
risks and alternatives associated with this surgery, along with its
potential benefits. He asks the patient whether she has any further
questions before anesthesia is administered. After the patient signs
the standard informed consent form and acknowledges that she
wishes to proceed with the surgery, the orthopedic surgeon leaves the
room to prepare for the procedure.
Shortly after the knee-replacement surgery, the patient begins
developing complications, ultimately requiring an additional surgery.
Frustrated with the outcome of the original procedure, the patient
chooses to have a different physician perform the second surgery. Despite all efforts during the second surgery, the patient loses full function of her leg.
J.D. Candidate 2015, Florida State University College of Law. I would like to thank
my parents, Laurie and Jim Haston, for their love and support throughout all of my educational endeavors. I would also like to thank the incredible faculty at the Florida State University College of Law for their support, feedback, and encouragement.
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The patient begins hearing rumors about the orthopedic surgeon’s
recent, nasty divorce. She also sees him at local restaurants, sitting
alone at the bar with a drink in front of him. After the patient calls
some mutual friends of the surgeon’s ex-wife, she learns that the orthopedic surgeon has developed a drinking problem since his divorce.
She decides to file a medical malpractice suit, alleging that the surgeon did not obtain her informed consent before the procedure because he failed to inform her of his alcoholism.
Situations like the one described above present an important and
undefined question to the medical field: whether a physician has a
duty to inform his patient about his alcoholism, drug abuse, and/or
mental illness (such as depression) in gaining a patient’s informed
consent before a procedure.1 On one hand, we live in a country with a
medical system that values patient autonomy.2 We believe a patient
has the right to make her own medical decisions based on a physician’s adequate disclosure of the potential risks and benefits involved
in a given procedure.3 The large amount of medical malpractice suits
and medical regulations also demonstrate the importance we place on
patient safety.4 On the other hand, however, we also recognize the
shortcomings of the informed consent doctrine.5 We recognize an individual’s right to privacy6 and that alcoholism, mental illness, and
drug-related impairments are private matters deserving protection
from disclosure to the public to effect recovery.7
This Note will argue that a physician, in gaining a patient’s informed consent, does not have a duty to disclose to the patient
whether he suffers, or has suffered, from alcoholism, drug abuse, or
mental illness. Physicians are still human and thus deserve the right
to privacy regarding such personal matters as are enjoyed by the
1. See Mary Anne Bobinski, Autonomy and Privacy: Protecting Patients from Their
Physicians, 55 U. PITT. L. REV. 291, 376 (1994) (“The types of personal characteristics . . .
requiring disclosure are undefined.”).
2. See Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“The root premise is
the concept, fundamental in American jurisprudence, that ‘[e]very human being of adult
years and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his own body.’ ”
(quoting Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914))).
3. See id. at 781.
4. See, e.g., Frederick Levy et al., The Patient Safety and Quality Improvement Act of
2005: Preventing Error and Promoting Patient Safety, 31 J. LEGAL MED. 398-406 (2010).
5. See Sheldon F. Kurtz, The Law of Informed Consent: From “Doctor is Right” to
“Patient has Rights”, 50 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1243, 1245 (2000).
6. See Barry R. Furrow, Data Mining and Substandard Medical Practice: The Difference Between Privacy, Secrets and Hidden Defects, 51 VILL. L. REV. 803, 803 (2006) (“We
properly value privacy: it is a desirable end state and a precondition for identity, allowing
individuals to achieve goals such as autonomy and solidarity with peers . . . .”).
7. See Rebecca Sara Feinberg, The Impaired Physician: Medical, Legal, and Ethical
Analysis with a Policy Recommendation, 34 NOVA L. REV. 595, 605 (2010) (“Confidentiality
is [a] key element to successful intervention and treatment.”).
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public generally. This Note will point out that such conditions do not
have as material of an effect on the performance of medical procedures as people generally assume. Yet, if these impairments were to
rise to a level such that patient safety would be compromised, liability must fall somewhere. Thus, instead of requiring physicians to disclose their personal impairments during the informed consent process, the emphasis should be placed on the hospital’s duty to properly
monitor its physicians’ credentials. Further, disclosure through the
informed consent doctrine is not the proper way to protect patients
from physicians who are incapable of adequately performing medical
procedures due to alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illnesses. Rather
than pointing the finger at the physician for lack of disclosure, the
issue of impaired physicians involves a bigger picture that the hospital system is, itself, deficient.
Hospitals should implement methods that will incentivize physicians to get the treatment they need without the attached stigmatization. Hospitals must implement and properly maintain confidential
yet effective programs designed to identify and rehabilitate physicians suffering from alcoholism, drug-dependency, and mental illnesses to ensure that those physicians practicing medicine are safely
capable of doing so. This emphasis on a hospital’s duty to monitor
and qualify physicians provides the ideal balance of physician privacy
and patient safety.
This Note will begin by exploring the history and evolution of the
informed consent doctrine in the American medical field. A discussion of the characteristics of “impaired physicians” will follow. This
Note will then examine the relationship between impaired physicians
and the scope of the informed consent doctrine. Finally, I will articulate that the duties of a hospital to monitor and credential physicians
via a corporate negligence theory strikes the proper balance between
protecting a physician’s privacy and patient’s safety.
II. INFORMED CONSENT DOCTRINE
The informed consent doctrine is a relatively recent phenomenon
principled on the American concept of autonomy.8 Informed consent
was seen as one tool in response to the imbalance of power in
the provider-patient relationship.9 The idea was that “requiring physicians to provide more information to their patients [would] help to

8. See Barbara L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV.
591, 594 (2006).
9. See MARK A. HALL ET AL., MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS
197-98 (Vicki Been et al. eds., 3d ed. 2013).
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redress the power imbalance problems created by the inequality
of knowledge.”10
The doctrine was originally an outgrowth of the tort of battery.11
Claims for an informed consent violation amounted to an intentional
and unauthorized touching of another. 12 Beginning in the 1950s,
courts “viewed risk nondisclosure situations as analogous to and an
extension of those battery cases where consent was fraudulently obtained.”13 Bringing an informed consent claim under a battery theory
had significant advantages over bringing a negligence-based claim:
First, and most importantly, battery did not require the patient to
prove by an expert medical witness that the defendant had deviated from an accepted medical standard of care. Second, battery did
not require the patient to prove that he would have refused the
treatment if he had been given the proper information. Third, battery would entitle the patient to recover damages even if the operation did not have a “bad result.” Fourth, as an intentional tort,
battery might have entitled the patient to an instruction on punitive damages, which would not be available in an action based upon negligence.14

Recognizing the possibility for unnecessary liability, courts gradually began pulling away from the battery theory of informed consent
and, instead, started moving toward a standard negligence theory of
medical malpractice.15 The battery-based claims generally dealt more
with procedures in which no consent was given, while the new negligence-based claims more commonly involved situations in which the
consent given was inadequate.16 Indeed, basing an informed consent
claim on a theory of negligence “more closely comports with the reality of medical practice.” 17 “[D]octors’ informed consent practices require the exercise of judgment. . . . Since the treating physician retains some flexibility in determining how much information to disclose, cases based on a failure to obtain informed consent, like other
medical malpractice claims, are based on negligence.”18

10. Id. at 198.
11. William J. McNichols, Informed Consent Liability in a “Material Information”
Jurisdiction: What Does the Future Portend?, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 711, 714-16 (1995).
12. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 593 (“[The informed consent doctrine] is a natural
outgrowth of the common law tort of battery that prohibits intentional unauthorized
bodily contact.”).
13. McNichols, supra note 11, at 714.
14. Id. at 715.
15. See id.
16. See Laurel R. Hanson, Note, Informed Consent and the Scope of a Physician’s Duty
of Disclosure, 77 N.D. L. REV. 71, 72, 75 (2001).
17. Atwell, supra note 8, at 595.
18. Id. at 595-96.
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Autonomy is a fundamental American concept that is furthered by
the informed consent doctrine.19 “Competent adults exercise that autonomy by deciding whether or not to consent to medical treatment.” 20 Judge Cardozo, in one of the pioneer cases involving informed consent, famously stated: “Every human being of adult years
and sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with
his own body.” 21 Thus, the informed consent doctrine ensures that
patients “have the material information with which to make an
informed choice.”22
There are two main standards that courts apply to determine a
physician’s required level of disclosure: the “reasonable patient” 23
standard and the “professional malpractice”24 standard.25 Under the
reasonable patient standard, a physician’s required level of disclosure
is that which a reasonable patient would consider “material” in making a medical treatment decision.26 Some courts have argued that determining the materiality of a risk from a reasonable patient’s point
of view is the best way to respect autonomy.27
The professional malpractice standard defines the scope of disclosure as the information which a reasonable physician in similar circumstances would provide to a patient. 28 Today, about half of the
states follow this standard.29 The professional malpractice standard
19. See id. at 594-95.
20. Id. at 594.
21. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), abrogated by Bing v.
Thunig, 142 N.E.2d 3, 7-9 (1957), superseded by statute, Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109, 1975
N.Y. Laws 134-35.
22. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 596.
23. This is also known as the “material risk” or “patient-centered” standard.
24. This is also known as the “professional disclosure” or “reasonable physician” standard.
25. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 205; Hanson, supra note 16, at 75.
26. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 205; see also Hanson, supra note 16, at 75.
27. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 786 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[T]he patient’s
right of self-decision shapes the boundaries of the duty to reveal. . . . The scope of the physician’s communications to the patient, then, must be measured by the patient’s need, and
that need is the information material to the decision.” (emphasis added)); see also Kurtz,
supra note 5, at 1251 (“The Canterbury patient-based standard seems more consistent with
the purpose of 'informed consent' which includes a respect for a patient’s autonomy interest
and a desire to have patients participate in the decision making process.”). “A small number of jurisdictions take an even more protective approach, requiring disclosure of information that a particular patient (as contrasted with a ‘rational patient’) would have wanted to make his or her decision.” HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 205.
28. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 205; see also Hanson, supra note 16, at 75.
29. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 214. “In adopting the reasonable physician standard,
courts seemed to be assuming that a competent physician acting in good faith would convey
to patients information essential to their understanding of relevant risks, benefits, and
alternatives, rather than simply provide the traditionally meager disclosures . . . .” Ben A.
Rich, Medical Paternalism v. Respect for Patient Autonomy: The More Things Change the
More They Remain the Same, 10 MICH. ST. U. J. MED. & L. 87, 106-07 (2006).
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does not require physicians to speculate as to what the reasonable
patient would want to know; instead, it applies the appropriate medical standard of care to utilize the physician’s professional judgment.30
Testimony from medical experts is necessary, however, because the
professional malpractice standard measures disclosure according to
the appropriate physician’s standard of care.31
Under either standard of informed consent, various situations
may excuse disclosure, 32 including emergencies, 33 areas of common
knowledge, 34 areas of individualized knowledge, 35 situations where
disclosure would “ ‘foreclose rational decision’ or ‘pose psychological
damage’ to the patient,”36 and occasions when a patient has waived
disclosure.37 Such exceptions to the doctrine are generally set up as
affirmative defenses.38
Regardless of which standard courts apply, the informed consent
doctrine has received significant criticism.39 Many studies suggest a
dichotomy between disclosure and comprehension or retention.40 As
such, even when physicians disclosed sufficient information, “few patients understood or remembered what they had been told about
their medical condition and treatment options.”41 Additionally, there
is a valid concern that excessive disclosure, often due to a fear of litigation, will result in patients foregoing medically necessary treat30. See Culbertson v. Mernitz, 602 N.E.2d 98, 103 (Ind. 1992) (“[A physician] should
not be called upon to be a ‘mind reader’ with the ability to peer into the brain of a prudent
patient to determine what such patient ‘needs to know,’ but should simply be called upon
the discuss medical facts and recommendations with the patient as a reasonably prudent
physician would.”).
31. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 215; see also Hanson, supra note 25, at 75 (“Under this
standard, a patient usually must present expert testimony to demonstrate that a physician,
following acceptable medical practice, would have disclosed the injury-causing risk.”).
32. See Hanson, supra note 25, at 73-75.
33. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 221 (“There is no duty to disclose information in an
emergency situation where the patient is not competent, immediate treatment is required
to prevent more serious harm, and no substitute decisionmaker is available.”).
34. Id. at 221 (“There is no duty to disclose risks ‘of which persons of average sophistication are aware.’ ”).
35. Id. (“The patient cannot recover for the physician’s failure to disclose a risk already known by the patient.”).
36. Id. at 221. This is known as the “therapeutic privilege,” which courts have applied
only in a few circumstances. Id. at 221-22.
37. Id. at 222.
38. See id. (“The defendant generally has the burden of proving that an exception to
the duty to inform is present.”).
39. See, e.g., Atwell, supra note 8, at 597-98 (“In practice, informed consent is far from
perfect.”); Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1245 (“[T]he doctrine falls short of its intended purpose.”).
40. See also, e.g., David A. Herz et al., Informed Consent: Is It a Myth?, 30
NEUROSURGERY 453 (1992); Alan Meisel & Loren H. Roth, Toward an Informed Discussion of
Informed Consent: A Review and Critique of Empirical Studies, 25 ARIZ. L. REV. 265 (1983).
41. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 202.
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ments.42 Other scholars suggest that the doctrine of informed consent
doctrine does not fulfill its “goals of patient protection” in the modern
practice of medicine.43 Further, the elements needed to succeed in a
cause of action for lack of informed consent make recovery difficult;
thus, many claims are never litigated.44
In bringing an informed consent claim, the plaintiff will generally
have to prove the following: “(1) that the medical procedure carried a
specific risk that was not disclosed, (2) that the physician violated the
applicable standard of disclosure, (3) that the undisclosed risk materialized, and (4) that the failure to disclose the information caused
the patient’s injury.”45
Proving materialization of the undisclosed risk and causation are
often the most difficult barriers for plaintiffs. 46 One can imagine
many circumstances where physicians might fail to disclose a risk
without the risk ever materializing. For example, if a physician fails
to disclose to a patient that a particular surgery could result in paralysis (arguably a very material risk), and paralysis never materializes, the patient would not have a valid claim against the physician.
When such a situation occurs, it seems the informed consent doctrine
serves the purpose of protecting patients from injury rather than its
stated purpose of respecting patient autonomy.47 To prove causation,
a plaintiff must convince the court that a reasonable patient in similar circumstances would have refused the treatment had the disclosure been sufficient.48 This requirement is often a very difficult burden of proof to satisfy and tends to raise a range of issues.49 While the
causation requirement is an objective standard, the jury is permitted
to consider the plaintiff’s particular circumstances.50 The law is still
fuzzy and inconsistent regarding how much of a plaintiff’s subjective
circumstances should be considered.51
42. See Barry R. Furrow, Doctors’ Dirty Little Secrets: The Dark Side of Medical Privacy, 37 WASHBURN L.J. 283, 293 (1998) (“Disclosure creates the risk that a patient will
refuse the physician’s care because of the status or the addiction, rather than looking at
the particular case and the risks posed.”). Ironically, this trend would actually compromise
patient safety.
43. Atwell, supra note 8, at 611.
44. See, e.g., HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 217.
45. Id.
46. See id.
47. “Vindicating patient autonomy is at the heart of all inadequate consent cases,
whether the theory is based on battery or negligence.” McNichols, supra note 11, at 715.
48. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 217.
49. See id. at 217-18.
50. See id. (“[A] fact finder applying objective causation rules may take into account characteristics of plaintiff, including ‘idiosyncrasies, fears, age, medical condition, and religious
beliefs.’ ” (quoting Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 123-24 (Tenn. 1999))).
51. See id.
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III. IMPAIRED PHYSICIANS
“As a result of their status [doctors] are expected to be above human
failings, while proving immune to the ailments that afflict the
general population. Nonetheless, to err is human and in being
human doctors inevitably make mistakes in the normal course of
providing care.”52

An “impaired physician is a medical doctor who suffers from alcoholism, drug addiction, or mental illness.”53 The American Medical
Association (AMA) uses the phrase “impaired physician” as a term of
art and defines it as “ ‘the inability to practice medicine adequately
by reason of physical or mental illness, including alcoholism or drug
dependency.’ ”54 The AMA’s designation of a physician as being impaired can potentially result in the suspension or revocation of the
physician’s medical license.55
“Given the everyday work stress that medical professionals experience, it is not surprising that many physicians may turn to alcohol
or substance abuse.”56 The rate of impairment for physicians is consistent among various specialties, regions, and age ranges; “[n]o
group of physicians are immune.”57 The problem is real and the numbers are frightening. The Medical Board of California estimates that
eighteen percent of the physicians in California abuse alcohol or other drugs at some point during their careers.58 The sad fact remains:
physicians have a higher rate of impairment than non-physicians, yet
they have more trouble securing treatment. 59 The fear that physicians will receive some negative stigma from their peers, along with
the fear of potential punishment, often causes physicians to conceal
their alcoholism, substance abuse, or mental illness.60 This pattern

52. A. Mavroforou et al., Alcohol and Drug Abuse Among Doctors, 25 MED. & L. 611,
612 (2006).
53. Feinberg, supra note 7, at 598.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 601, 613. For purposes of this note, the phrase “impaired physician” shall
refer to the concept more generally (that of a physician suffering from alcoholism, drug
abuse, or mental illness) rather than the term of art, as used by the AMA.
56. Ila S. Rothschild, Law for Physicians: An Overview of Medical Legal Issues, 21 J.
LEGAL MED. 437, 440 (2000) (book review).
57. Roger S. Cicala, Substance Abuse Among Physicians: What You Need to Know,
HOSPITAL PHYSICIAN, July 2003, at 39.
58. See Lucian L. Leape & John A. Fromson, Problem Doctors: Is There a System-Level
Solution?, 144 ANNALS INTERNAL MED. 107, 108 (2006).
59. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 599 (“Physicians have both a higher prevalence of
impairment and more difficulty obtaining treatment than non-physicians.”).
60. Id. (“[T]he impaired physician often conceals his addiction because the stigma
attached to physician impairment makes seeking help significantly more difficult
than for the general population. Potential punitive responses may also play a role in
incenting concealment.”).
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means that physicians have a much lower likelihood of receiving the
treatment they need.61
Alcoholism and substance abuse have been so stigmatized among
medical professionals that discussion of the topic is taboo.62 Despite
the high incidences of alcoholism and drug abuse among physicians,
little talk is present at professional meetings, and coverage in medical school curricula is sparse.63
Unsurprisingly, there is a good deal of literature arguing that
physician impairment has a significant, negative impact on a physician’s medical performance.64 One study reveals that physicians who
reported making a major medical mistake within the last three
months were more likely to suffer from depression or struggle from
alcohol or drug dependence.65 However, as one professor at the University of Tennessee College of Medicine also suggests: “Most physician substance abusers continue to function quite well until the problem is far advanced.”66 Further, “[a]lcoholics can often remain sober
during working hours for many years, even though they drink large
quantities at night and on weekends.”67 Other medical literature often compares alcoholism in physicians to sleep-deprivation. Indeed,
studies have revealed that physicians who have not slept in twentyfour hours (as is not entirely uncommon) have impaired “cognitive
psychomotor performance to the same degree as having a 0.1% blood
alcohol level.”68 Yet, there is a lack of empirical evidence demonstrating a correlation between sleep deprivation and medical errors.69 This

61. See id. at 600.
62. See Cicala, supra note 57, at 39; see also Feinberg, supra note 7, at 597 (“Physician
addiction is taboo, but this silence injures both the physician and his patients.”).
63. Cicala, supra note 57, at 39.
64. See, e.g., Bobinski, supra note 1, at 298-99 (“The abuse of drugs and alcohol is in
turn associated with higher risks of work-related performance deficits. Physicians with
substance abuse problems may present several different sorts of risks to their patients.”);
Feinberg, supra note 7, at 597 (“Alcohol and drug addiction interfere with multiple functions in daily life. There is no doubt, when the addicted individuals are physicians, the
interference affects their ability to practice medicine, causing their patients to receive a
lower standard of care than they would otherwise receive.”).
65. Looking at Alcohol Use Disorders Among Surgeons, PHYSICIAN’S WEEKLY (Aug.
23, 2012), http://www.physiciansweekly.com/surgeons-alcohol-use-disorders/ [hereinafter
Alcohol Use]. However, “the study did not identify the nature of the errors or
determine the cause and effect.” Carolyne Krupa, 15% of Surgeons Struggle with Alcohol
Problems, AM. MED. NEWS (Mar. 6, 2012), http://www.amednews.com/article/20120306/
profession/303069998/8/.
66. Cicala, supra note 57, at 39.
67. Id.
68. Merit Buckley, Imposing Liability in the United States Medical Residency
Program: Exhaustion, Errors, and Economic Dependence, 12 DEPAUL J. HEALTH CARE L.
305, 313 (2009).
69. See id. at 314.
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logically seems to suggest that a similar correlation between alcoholism and medical errors would also be lacking.70
Regardless, the fact remains that there is a higher percentage of
physicians suffering from alcoholism or drug abuse than there is in
the general population, and something must be done to address this.
IV. IMPAIRED PHYSICIANS AND THE SCOPE OF INFORMED CONSENT
Under either a professional malpractice standard or a reasonable
patient standard, the exact scope of required disclosure remains gray.
It is clear that informed consent requires, at a baseline, the benefits
and risks of a particular medical procedure and potential medical alternatives.71 But even at this minimal level, how much does a physician have to disclose about the benefits, and how significant must a
risk be to warrant disclosure? The reasonable patient standard
attempts to answer this question by applying the materiality concept:
whether the information would be material to the reasonable
patient’s decision about the treatment. 72 Yet, this also leaves little
guidance. The professional malpractice standard judges the scope
of disclosure based on the applicable standard of care in the particular circumstances, but this often and simply yields a battle of
expert witnesses.73
The bottom line is that the exact scope of required disclosure, under either standard, remains unknown.74 Given this level of uncertainty, coupled with increased medical litigation and attention to
patient autonomy,75 it is not surprising that the trend in the informed
consent doctrine seems to be moving toward expanding the scope
of disclosure.
Beyond just the disclosure of risks, benefits, and alternatives to
the medical treatment, recent attempts to raise this “floor” of disclosure have been made.76 Attention has been drawn towards disclosure
of a medical treatment’s economic implications and a physician’s per-

70. See Alcohol Use, supra note 65 (“Although actual injury to patients from impaired
physicians is incredibly rare, alcohol abuse and dependence are important factors to consider when thinking about patient safety in surgery . . . .”).
71. See Bobinski, supra note 1, at 293 (“In the past, both patients and courts have
focused attention on the benefits and risks of a particular treatment . . . .”).
72. See Hanson, supra note 16, at 75.
73. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 596.
74. See Bobinski, supra note 1, at 342-43.
75. I say this hesitantly. See supra Part II for a critique of the informed consent doctrine.
76. See Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1255-56 (“In recent years, the preoccupation of the
informed consent rules with disclosure of risks inherent in a proposed treatment has expanded to the disclosure of risks of not having a proposed treatment and risks associated
with having treatment by a particular physician.”).
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sonal characteristics. 77 The personal characteristics of physicians
that have been discussed as potentially warranting disclosure before
medical procedures include a physician’s surgical experience,78 HIV
status, 79 deterioration of skills, 80 conflicts of interest, 81 and impairments.82 Though the majority rule does not require physicians to disclose personal characteristics, a growing minority of states are requiring such disclosures.83
Although the scope of disclosure obligations continues to expand,
the line must be drawn somewhere. Requiring physicians to disclose
to patients that they have suffered from, or are currently suffering
from, alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness, opens the door to
a flood of other potential disclosure obligations. Sure, one could argue
that alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness has the potential
to negatively affect a physician’s medical performance, and thus
should be disclosed.84 But if we are willing to say that these personal
impairments require disclosure, where do we end? Conceivably,
almost every personal attribute of a physician might be relevant

77. See id. at 1257-58.
78. See Johnson v. Kokemoor, 545 N.W.2d 495, 498, 506-07 (Wis. 1996) (proposing
that a physician’s lack of experience with intricate and difficult procedures may be material to a patient’s decision to proceed with the particular physician, rather than the actual
procedure). However, the Johnson principle of disclosure has not been widely expanded, as
the case is seen as unique and fact-specific. See Barry R. Furrow, Patient Safety and the
Fiduciary Hospital: Sharpening Judicial Remedies, 1 DREXEL L. REV. 439, 454 (2009); see
also Emmanuel O. Iheukwumere, Doctor, Are You Experienced? The Relevance of Disclosure of Physician Experience to a Valid Informed Consent, 18 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. &
POL’Y 373, 402-07 (2002).
79. See Iheukwumere, supra note 78, at 396.
80. See Semeraro v. Connolly, Civ. A. No. 92-4636, 1992 WL 392621, at *1 (E.D. Pa.
Dec. 14, 1992).
81. Compare Furrow, supra note 78, at 452 (“Courts have been less willing to impose
an obligation on physicians to disclose putative economic conflicts of interest.”), with Moore
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 793 P.2d 479, 485 (Cal. 1990) (“[A] physician who is seeking
a patient’s consent for a medical procedure must, in order to satisfy his fiduciary duty and
to obtain the patient’s informed consent, disclose personal interests unrelated to the patient’s health, whether research or economic, that may affect his medical judgment.”).
82. See, e.g., Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1196 (La. Ct. App. 1991)
83. See, e.g., id. (holding that physician’s failure to inform patient of physician’s
chronic alcohol abuse violated obligations of informed consent disclosure); Gaston v.
Hunter, 588 P.2d 326, 351 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1978) (stating that a physician’s surgical experience should be disclosed to a patient during the informed consent process).
84. See Hidding, 578 So. 2d at 1196 (holding that physician’s chronic alcohol abuse
“create[d] a material risk associated with the surgeon’s ability to perform, which if disclosed would have obliged the patient to have elected another course of treatment . . . .”);
see also Iheukwumere, supra note 78, at 402 (“Certainly, the fact of a physician’s alcoholism would be of significant concern to a reasonable patient, since an alcohol impaired physician, or one likely to be impaired during an invasive procedure would impact on the likelihood of a mistake during the procedure.”).

1136

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 41:1125

to a patient in making a decision on whether to proceed with a
medical intervention.85
For example, consider a physician who skips breakfast the morning of a surgery. Should he have to inform his patient of this personal
detail? If a physician skips breakfast, he will certainly become hungry (if he is not already). Surely, hunger could potentially have a
negative effect on a physician’s medical performance.
Even more extreme yet under the same logic, consider a physician
who gets into a heated argument with his wife the night before performing surgery and is now in a bad mood. Should he be required to
inform his patient of this in gaining consent before the surgery? One
could also see how a bad mood might negatively affect a physician’s
medical performance.
And finally, consider a physician who has a ritual of listening to a
certain song before every surgery for good luck. He has listened to
this song before every successful surgery for the past fifteen years of
his practice. The morning of his next surgery, however, he is in a
rush and does not get a chance to listen to his “lucky song.” Cognizant that he skipped this important step, he becomes concerned.
Should the physician have to disclose this information to his patient?
As outrageous as the scenario might sound, requiring disclosure of
this idiosyncrasy logically follows from the current, expanding scope
of the informed consent doctrine.
As demonstrated above, expanding the disclosure obligations to
include a physician’s alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness has
the potential to create unintended bounds.86 The process of obtaining
informed consent from a patient will likely transform from an explanation of the potential risks associated with a procedure to a laundrylist-reading of the physician’s personal life.87 In fact, for this exact
reason, the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania refused to expand the
doctrine of informed consent to include mandatory disclosure of a
physician’s alcoholism.88 As explained in Kaskie v. Wright, “[t]o do so,
where the absent information consists of facts personal to the treating physician, extends the doctrine into realms well beyond its original boundaries.”89 Such an expansion of the doctrine will likely make
85. See Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213, 217 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1991) (affirming summary
judgment for defendant physician in an informed consent claim, rhetorically asking: “Are
patients to be informed of every fact which might conceivably affect performance in the
surgical suite?”).
86. See id.
87. See Bobinski, supra note 1, at 295 (“A seemingly infinite number of provider characteristics combine to determine the physician’s ability to deliver appropriate care to a
particular patient at any given moment.”).
88. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217.
89. Id.
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any attempt at line-drawing very difficult,90 and patients will likely
become so overwhelmed with information to the point that they decline many important medical procedures.
Though physicians are undoubtedly held to higher expectations
than the general public and are bound by fiduciary obligations to
their patients,91 it is easy to forget that physicians are still human.
Physicians make mistakes and have struggles in their personal lives
just like everyone else. Because alcoholism, drug abuse, and mental
illnesses are such personal and sensitive issues, physicians will have
even more incentive to conceal or deny any such problems if they
know they will have to share these details with their patients. The
result will be even more physicians who are unable to seek the
treatment they need due to conscious denial or concealment.92 Further, because physicians are even more likely to keep their impairments invisible, as has been indicated, requiring physicians to disclose such impairments to patients in the informed consent process
will likely be a fruitless expansion of the doctrine.
This is not to say that a patient who receives substandard care
from a physician who suffered from alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness is without legal recourse against that physician.93 However, such recourse does not create a separate legal issue under the informed consent doctrine.94 Legal remediation for substandard care is
still an option for patients who are injured by their physicians’ negligence.95 As the Court of Appeals of Arizona properly held as a matter
of law in Ornelas v. Fry:
[T]he fact that [the physician] may have been an alcoholic at the
time of the surgery on [the patient] does not create in and of itself
a separate issue or claim of negligence. It is only when that alcoholism translates into conduct falling below the applicable standard of care that it has any relevance.96

90. See id. (explaining that expansion of the informed consent doctrine to include disclosure of a physician’s alcoholism will make limitations not easily definable).
91. See Furrow, supra note 78, at 444.
92. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 598 (“It is [the] risk to patients that makes physician impairment incompatible with the practice of medicine. And it is this incompatibility
that leads the impaired physicians to further conceal their addiction . . . .”).
93. See Duttry v. Patterson, 771 A.2d. 1255, 1259 (Pa. 2001) (“[I]nformation personal
to the physician, whether solicited by the patient or not, is irrelevant to the doctrine of
informed consent. Our holding should not, however, be read to stand for the proposition
that a physician who misleads a patient is immune from suit. . . . [We do not] see a need to
expand this doctrine into a catchall theory of recovery since other causes of action provide
avenues for redress to the injured patient.”).
94. See Ornelas v. Fry, 727 P.2d 819, 823 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1986).
95. See Duttry, 771 A.2d at 1259 (“For example, it is conceivable that a physician’s lack
of experience in performing an operation would support a plaintiff’s case in negligence.”).
96. Ornelas, 727 P.2d at 823.
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Additionally, it is undisputed that the doctrine of informed consent is based on the concept of autonomy. Under the most patientfriendly standard of the doctrine, a physician informs a patient of the
material risks associated with the procedure in order to facilitate an
informed decisionmaking process.97 However, to allow practicability
of the doctrine, the materiality of a risk must be limited to risks specifically related to the medical procedure itself. 98 Determining the
materiality of a risk specifically related to the medical procedure has
already proven to be a difficult task.99 If we further consider the physician’s personal characteristics to be a material risk, the doctrine
will eventually prove unworkable because of undefined boundaries.100
By disclosing the risks “specifically germane to surgical or operative treatment,”101 a patient is able to exercise his “right to determine
what shall be done with his own body.”102 This limitation to the concept of materiality accomplishes the doctrine’s intended goal: autonomy.103 However, considering a physician’s impairment to be a material risk is not concerned with autonomy, it concerns something entirely separate: patient safety.
The arguments in favor of expanding the informed consent doctrine to impose a disclosure obligation of the physician’s alcoholism,
drug abuse, or mental illnesses all implicitly center around the same
general argument: such physician impairments negatively affect a
physician’s performance of medical procedures, thereby compromising the safety of the patient.104 Yet, the informed consent doctrine
97. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 594-95.
98. The informed consent doctrine should not be expanded “to include matters not
specifically germane to surgical or operative treatment.” Kaskie v. Wright, 589 A.2d 213,
217 (Pa. Super. 1991); see also Semeraro v. Connolly, Civ. A. No. 92-4636, 1992 WL 392621
(E.D. Pa. Dec. 14, 1992).
99. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 217-18; Iheukwumere, supra note 78, at 392
(“Subsequent to Canterbury many important informed consent decisions came down addressing the materiality of information in divergent ways . . . .”); see also Feinberg, supra
note 7, at 621 (“There is no clear consensus in the courts or in the medical literature about
physician disclosure and the informed consent process.”).
100. See Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217 (refusing to expand the informed consent doctrine to
include matters not specifically germane to the surgical treatment because such expansion
would “extend[] the doctrine into realms well beyond its original boundaries” and limitations would not be easily definable).
101. Kaskie, 589 A.2d at 217.
102. See Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosp., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (1914), abrogated by Bing
v. Thunig, 142 N.E.2d 3, 7-9 (1957), superseded by statute, Act of May 21, 1975, ch. 109,
1975 N.Y. Laws 134-35.
103. Kurtz, supra note 5, at 1251.
104. See, e.g., Hidding v. Williams, 578 So. 2d 1192, 1198 (La. Ct. App. 1991) (determining that the physician’s abuse of alcohol “increased [the] potential for injury during
surgery”); Feinberg, supra note 7, at 597 (stating that physician impairment results in
“patients . . . receiv[ing] a lower standard of care than they would otherwise receive”); Furrow, supra note 42, at 293 (“Certainly an alcoholic surgeon may have an impairment that
might seriously affect performance and thus success rate.”); Iheukwumere, supra note 78,
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was not developed with the purpose of ensuring patient safety.105 The
doctrine was simply intended to allow patients to weigh the potential
risks against the potential benefits of a specific medical procedure in
order to informatively decide for themselves whether they wish to
proceed with the procedure.106 However, within this informed decisionmaking process, the patient must be able to assume that the
physician will operate in a reasonably safe manner; the patient must
be able to proceed under an assumption that the physician’s alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness will not pose a significant risk.107
The solution to such a dilemma is not an expansion of the informed consent doctrine. If a physician is truly impaired by alcoholism, drug abuse, or a mental illness such that it will significantly and
negatively affect his performance of medical procedures to a degree
that would compromise patient safety, the physician should not be
able to simply disclose this information to a patient and avoid any
potential liability. The informed consent doctrine should not be expanded such that it can be used strategically as a liability “out”
where physicians are truly unfit to perform medical procedures. Instead, stepping back and considering the bigger picture is necessary.
V. DUTIES OF THE HOSPITAL: A CORPORATE NEGLIGENCE THEORY
“[With impaired physicians,] the goal is to eliminate the risk to the patient, not simply to inform the patient and let the patient choose.”108

Despite various opinions in medical literature, something we
know for sure is that physicians who are currently suffering or have
suffered from alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness may pose
threats to patient safety by performing medical operations.109 If such
impairment reaches a level where patient safety would be compromised, the solution is not disclosure through expanded informed con-

at 402 (“[A]n alcohol impaired physician . . . would impact on the likelihood of a mistake
during the procedure.”); see also Judice v. Hosp. Serv. Dist. No. 1, 919 F. Supp. 978, 984
(E.D. La. 1996) (holding that the discovery of alcohol in a physician’s system just prior to
surgery raised valid concerns about the risk to public safety).
105. “[P]atient autonomy is at the heart of all inadequate consent cases . . . .” McNichols, supra note 11, at 715.
106. See Atwell, supra note 8, at 596 (“Informed consent, then, is designed to protect
patients by ensuring that they have the material information with which to make an
informed choice.”).
107. See Bobinski, supra note 1, at 302 (discussing other personal physician conflicts:
“we want to ensure that patients receive good quality care of sufficient amount, duration,
and scope regardless . . . .”).
108. Furrow, supra note 42, at 293.
109. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 598.
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sent obligations, but rather a bigger-picture solution: placing a duty
on hospitals to properly credential and monitor physicians.110
A hospital’s duty to non-negligently credential and monitor physicians is an obligation that is part of a larger conception known as
the “corporate negligence theory.”111 Under the corporate negligence
theory, a hospital can be held directly liable for injuries to patients
resulting from substandard medical care.112 The reasons for such a
theory are obvious: as blame for sub-quality medical treatment
continues to be placed directly on the treating physicians, hospitals
will be free of any duty (and thus any incentive) to try and prevent
medical errors.113
Consider the nature of the modern hospital. Hospitals are big
businesses, spending millions marketing themselves through “expensive advertising campaigns.” They provide a range of health services,
and the public expects emergency care, radiological and other testing
services, and other functions as a result of hospitals’ self-promotion.
And yet the legal relationships in the hospital are byzantine, creating
two strongly autonomous management structures side by side: a hospital administrative structure in parallel with the hospital medical
staff, which operates as a staff of independent contractors. The very
existence of this odd structure shields hospitals from liability under
agency law rules for the errors of their physicians, even when it is the
hospital systems that have allowed the physicians to fail.114
The concept of placing liability directly on a hospital under a corporate negligence theory has long been argued as an abdication of the
medical practice; “only an individual properly educated and licensed,
and not a corporation, may practice medicine.”115 Traditionally, hospitals were seen as merely the structure under which physicians operated. 116 Nonetheless, in 1965, the Supreme Court of Illinois announced its decision to impose liability directly on a hospital for inju110. See Furrow, supra note 42, at 293 (“[D]isclosure of [the physicians’] limitations
may be of questionable efficacy . . . . It risks destroying provider privacy while reducing the
pressure on state authorities and hospitals to monitor their physicians and set proper and
reasonable standards for practice.”).
111. See Judith M. Kinney, Tort Law—Expansion of Hospital Liability Under the Doctrine of “Corporate Negligence”—Thompson v. Nason Hospital, 591 A.2d 703 (Pa. 1991), 65
TEMP. L. REV. 787, 792 (1992).
112. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 481 (“Direct or ‘corporate’ liability contrasts with
vicarious liability in that it imposes on hospitals a duty of care owed directly to patients
with respect to medical judgment.”).
113. See Furrow, supra note 42, at 459.
114. Id. (emphasis added).
115. Darling v. Charleston Cmty. Mem’l Hosp., 211 N.E.2d 253, 256 (Ill. 1965).
116. See Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 169 (Wash. 1984) (“The hospital’s role is no
longer limited to the furnishing of physical facilities and equipment where a physician
treats his private patients and practices his profession in his own individualized manner.”).
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ries resulting from physician error.117 Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital has since been seen as the seminal case for
imposing direct liability on a hospital via a corporate negligence theory for substandard medical care.118
A hospital’s duty to non-negligently credential its physicians is the
critical first step to addressing the issue of impaired physicians. This
duty “entails reviewing physicians’ competency and performance history before admission to the medical staff and periodically (typically
every two years) thereafter.”119 The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in
Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hospital described the minimum requirements for a hospital (or the hospital’s credentialing
committee) in investigating and evaluating an applicant’s qualifications for hospital privileges:
[A] hospital should, at a minimum, require completion of the application and verify the accuracy of the applicant’s statements . . . . Additionally, it should: (1) solicit information from the
applicant’s peers, including those not referenced in his application,
who are knowledgeable about his education, training, experience,
health, competence and ethical character; (2) determine if the applicant is currently licensed to practice in this state and if his licensure or registration has been or is currently being challenged;
and (3) inquire whether the applicant has been involved in any adverse malpractice action and whether he has experienced a loss of
medical organization membership or medical privileges or membership at any other hospital. The investigating committee must
also evaluate the information gained through its inquiries and
make a reasonable judgment as to the approval or denial of each
application for staff privileges.120

Additionally, in 1986, the National Practitioner Data Bank
(NPDB) was established as part of the Healthcare Quality Improvement Act121 and was designed to provide licensing and credentialing
entities with a more uniform body of information regarding discipli-

117. Darling, 211 N.E.2d at 258.
118. HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 481. “Conventional forms of direct liability entail
primarily administrative, not medical, functions such as maintaining safe premises, sterile
equipment, and adequate rules and regulations. Darling is recognized as extending direct
corporate liability to substandard medical care rendered by independent doctors. Hospitals
thus can be found liable for some act of negligence on their part with respect to patient care
decisions made by independent doctors . . . .” Id.
119. Id. at 482.
120. Johnson v. Misericordia Cmty. Hosp., 301 N.W.2d 156, 174-75 (Wis. 1981).
121. Healthcare Quality Improvement Act of 1986, 42 U.S.C. §§ 11101–11152 (2006).
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nary actions taken against physicians.122 Especially following the establishment of this databank, the duty to properly credential physicians makes clear that a hospital cannot simply plead ignorance with
respect to a physician’s information in granting that physician privileges.123 Imposing this duty on hospitals also means that if a hospital
chooses to grant privileges to a physician who has suffered from alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illness in the past, the hospital bears
the risk of such impairments resurfacing. Through the credentialing
process, the hospital should be regarded as having been put on notice
about potential relapses that may occur and thus should be charged
with taking necessary, continual steps to prevent such occurrences.
Further, a hospital should be free to grant privileges to a physician
currently undergoing treatment for alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental
illness; however, it should be presumed that the hospital underwent
investigative measures to ensure that this physician is able to safely
practice medicine.124 The AMA has made clear that it opposes the discrimination against otherwise capable physicians solely because “the
physician is either presently, or has in the past, been under the supervision of a medical licensing board in a program of rehabilitation.”125
Hospitals must be charged with granting privileges to only those
physicians capable of safely practicing medicine. This may entail a
standardized screening evaluation for current alcoholism, drug
abuse, or mental illness. When this evaluation is conducted at the
commencement of the credentialing process, it will be regarded as
nondiscriminatory and can be a step towards removing the stigmatization of such impairments in the medical profession. In a case for
negligent credentialing, evidence to show a breach of this duty would
122. “The comprehensive reporting system requires medical boards to report licensure
revocations, suspensions, restrictions, censures, reprimands, probation, and licenses surrendered relating to the physician’s professional competence or professional conduct. The
statutory restrictions of the ADA do not insulate impaired physicians from being reported
to the NPDB.” Yuri N. Walker, Protecting the Public: The Impact of the Americans with
Disabilities Act on Licensure Considerations Involving Mentally Impaired Medical and
Legal Professionals, 25 J. LEGAL MED. 441, 447 (2004).
123. See Elisabeth Ryzen, The National Practitioner Data Bank: Problems and Proposed Reforms, 13 J. LEGAL MED. 409, 411, 419 (1992) (“Hospitals are required to query the
Data Bank before granting physicians privileges. . . . Failure to request information [from
the NPDB every two years] means the hospital will be presumed to have knowledge of any
information in the Data Bank concerning the applicant in any subsequent lawsuit.”). Nonetheless, the consistency of the NPDB regarding the reporting of physician impairments
needs improvement. See POLICIES RELATED TO PHYSICIAN HEALTH § H-355.992 (Am. Med.
Ass’n 2011) (“Our AMA will continue to monitor the issue of reporting impaired physicians
to the National Practitioner Data Bank and will seek further clarification of ambiguities or
misinterpretations of the reporting requirements for impaired physicians.”).
124. See Katharine A. Van Tassel, Blacklisted: The Constitutionality of the Federal
System for Publishing Reports of “Bad” Doctors in the National Practitioner Data Bank, 33
CARDOZO L. REV. 2031, 2057 (2012); see also Kinney, supra note 111, at 793-95 (discussing
actual or constructive notice triggering a hospital’s duties to act).
125. POLICIES RELATED TO PHYSICIAN HEALTH, supra note 123, § H-275.949.
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include the hospital’s own bylaws on credentialing physicians, state
licensing regulations, the Joint Commission’s Standards for Hospital
Accreditation,126 common law, and other relevant authorities.127
The hospital’s duty to non-negligently credential physicians is
generally accepted by the courts as part of the obligations of hospital
administration. 128 However, an affirmative duty on the hospital to
monitor its physicians has been seen as more controversial.129 Several
courts have rebuffed any duty to contemporaneously monitor treatment decisions made by its physicians, reasoning that it would constitute an unlawful interference of the physician-patient relationship.130
Starting at the local level, under a corporate negligence theory, a
hospital must be much more active in monitoring its physicians to
ensure those practicing medicine are safely capable of doing so. 131
Given that the hospital should have non-negligently credentialed its
physicians, it will be charged as being on notice of any potential red
flags in the physician’s record of past or current alcoholism, drug
abuse, or mental illness. The hospital should have a heightened affirmative duty to monitor these physicians.
In order to adequately monitor physicians, general awareness of
the prevalence of impaired physicians must increase. 132 Hospitals’
risk management committees should go through training and education programs on the potential signs of alcoholism, drug abuse, or
mental illnesses. Similar information should be distributed to all
hospital staff so that everyone is aware of the symptoms to look for in
potentially impaired physicians. The frequent monitoring of these
high-risk physicians, then, should include frequent in-person interviews, self-evaluations, and anonymous peer-review programs.
To ensure that such monitoring programs are effective, however,
hospitals also need to have a system in place that guarantees confi126. See JOINT COMMISSION, www.jointcommission.org (last visited June 29, 2014).
127. See Kinney, supra note 111, at 790-91.
128. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 482. But see Paulino v. QHG of Springdale, Inc.,
386 S.W.3d 462, 467 (Ark. 2012) (refusing to recognize a claim for negligent credentialing
on the basis that regulatory oversight of hospitals is sufficient).
129. See HALL ET AL., supra note 9, at 482.
130. See, e.g., Gafner v. Down East Cmty. Hosp., 735 A.2d 969, 979-80 (Me. 1999).
131. Id. at 979 (quoting Pedroza v. Bryant, 677 P.2d 166, 168-69 (Wash. 1984)) (“The
doctrine of corporate negligence has . . . been utilized by courts to require hospitals to exercise reasonable care to insure that the physicians selected as members of hospital medical
staffs are competent. [Those courts] have also held that hospitals have a continuing duty to
review and delineate staff privileges so that incompetent staff physicians are not retained.”). “Health care’s casual approach to monitoring physician performance contrasts
markedly to that of other professions whose conduct affects the public welfare. Commercial
pilots, for example, must pass both physical and performance examinations every year.”
Leape, supra note 58, at 109.
132. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 597 (“Physician addiction is taboo, but this silence
injures both the physician and his patients.”).
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dentiality and includes penalty waivers.133 Because many physicians
already conceal any impairment they may have for fear of potential
penalties and stigmatization from their peers, hospitals must ensure
that all monitoring policies are conducted with the utmost respect for
the physician’s confidentiality.134 Upon discovering alcoholism, drug
abuse, or mental illnesses in physicians, hospitals should motivate
those physicians to seek recovery through participation in treatment
programs.135 Every state has a form of a physician health program
designed specifically for physicians suffering from alcoholism or substance abuse.136 Completion of such a program should be a prerequisite for waiving the penalty of a complete revocation of hospital privileges, which will encourage physicians to obtain the treatment they
need but all so often do not get.
Imposing liability on hospitals for negligent credentialing and
monitoring of physicians, rather than expanding the doctrine of
informed consent, will place the task of determining the competency
of physicians with the party in the more capable position to do so:
the hospital.
VI. CONCLUSION
“The real issue is whether the physician is likely to perform well,
regardless of an impairment or other personal characteristic.” 137

Physicians suffering from alcoholism, drug abuse, or mental illnesses may be perfectly capable of performing medical treatments to
the necessary standard of quality.138 However, should such impairments rise to a level such that the safety of the patient is compromised, liability must fall somewhere in order to ensure proper preventative measures are taken and injured patients are not left without legal recourse.
The prevalence of physicians suffering from alcoholism, drug
abuse, or mental illnesses is a sad reality that cannot continue to be
ignored.139 However, attempting to solve such a large-scale issue by
expanding the scope of disclosure obligations under the informed
consent doctrine would be both impracticable and counterintuitive.
Such an expansion would be inconsistent with the original purpose of
133. See Feinberg, supra note 7, at 608.
134. See id.
135. See id. at 607-09.
136. See Cicala, supra note 57, at 43-44.
137. Furrow, supra note 42, at 293.
138. See id. (“[A disclosure obligation] raises a difficult causation question, since alcoholism may not always impair a physician’s performance.”).
139. See generally Feinberg, supra note 7, at 605 (discussing the prevalence of alcoholism, drug abuse, and similar impairments in the medical field).
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informed consent and would render the doctrine so lacking in certainty that it would eventually prove completely unworkable.
Further, confidentiality is an essential element for the proper
identification of, treatment of, and recovery from alcoholism, drug
abuse, and mental illness. Patients want to be sure that impaired
physicians, incapable of safely practicing medicine, are identified and
obtain the treatment they need. Yet, requiring physicians to disclose
to patients that they suffer from, or have suffered from, such impairments would be entirely illogical to achieve such a goal.
Addressing the issue of impaired physicians is part of a much
larger web of actors than can be remedied through the informed consent doctrine. Awareness to the problem of impaired physicians must
increase generally within the medical profession. State medical
boards and the Joint Commission on Accreditation of Health Care
Organizations must cooperate with hospitals so that they have the
necessary tools and information to begin the process.
Rather than expanding the informed consent doctrine, liability
should be placed on the hospital under a corporate negligence theory
when a hospital negligently credentials and monitors its physicians.
The hospital is in the best position to ensure the competency of the
physicians performing medical treatments, not the patient. Such a
structure would protect the privacy of the physician and encourage
detection and rehabilitation while having the effect of increasing patient safety on a broader scale.
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